This study sought the opinions of a select group of professionals, trained in medicine and law concerning: professional privilege; management of patients who posed risks to society; and the legal charge to impose upon a patient with uncontrolled epilepsy who caused a fatality by driving contrary to medical advice.
INTRODUCTION
The code of conduct, as prepared by the Royal Australian College of Physicians (RACP), clearly states:
The principle of confidentiality is fundamental to the relationship between doctor and patient. Respect for confidentiality, as with consent, gives expression to the patient's autonomy by acknowledging that it is the patient who controls any information relating to his or her medical condition or treatment. Medical information should not be divulged by a physician except with the consent of the patient'.
The RACP acknowledged the need for consideration of overriding public interest particularly within the domain of driving and further 1059-l 31 l/98/060459 + 10 $12.00/O accepted there exist _ . statutory provisions that permit or compel the physician to breach patient confidentiality.
The guidelines went on to state that, [I] n all cases the patient should be told that the physician intends to make the disclosure and the reasons for this decision.
In the same publication, under the rubric of 'Litigation and the Fear of Litigation' the RACP guidelines on ethics stated:
They [meaning responses in the face of need to seek advice when in doubt] should always involve the patient and, where appropriate the patient's family or agent in decisions regarding management, with due consideration of perceived risks and benefits.
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Privacy was the focus of the first academic meeting of the newly incorporated Australian College of Legal Medicine (ACLM). At that meeting there was a survey conducted to examine questions of professional privilege and legal liability with respect to the doctor/patient relationship, driving and patients with epilepsy'. The majority recognised the need for professional privilege but also felt that the doctor had a duty to report patients who posed a risk to the community. Acknowledging that it was a small but highly qualified sample, comprising doctors with legal training, a significant minority objected to the concept of a 'duty' to report such patients, as contrasted with a 'right' to so act. That survey did not examine what respondents would do if faced with the dilemma of treating a patient who had uncontrolled epilepsy but for whom it was apparent that the medical advice, not to drive, was potentially or actually being ignored.
As 'Epilepsy and the Law' was one of the main topics of the 21st International Epilepsy Congress (IEC) in Sydney, there was considerable attention focused upon 'Driving and Epilepsy' with discussions which reported practices in various countries and the impact that this had for the doctor/patient relationship3-6. McLachlan6.7 examined the practices of Canadian neurologists, as regards reporting, with special reference to the dichotomy of states which either mandated compulsory reporting or did not do so. Black and Lai'. lo examined the situation in South Australia. the only Australian state which, in strict application of Section 148 of The Road Traffic Act (1973) . has legislated for compulsory reporting of people with epilepsy who drive and hence pose a risk.
The second academic seminar of the ACLM" focused upon road trauma and the medico-legal and forensic implications related to the same. The paper that follows reports the findings of a survey, conducted at the conclusion of that meeting, which further explored the attitudes of the participants towards questions of professional privilege for the medical profession. It also sought to define what respondents would do in the face of treating non-compliant patients who ignored medical advice not to drive. Further, it questioned what should be the legal consequences for such patients if they caused a fatality as a result of such non-compliance.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
At the conclusion of the second academic seminar of the ACLM, which focused upon road trauma, a survey was conducted of the participants, to define the demographics regarding professional qualifications and the nature of their principal practice (be it as a doctor or lawyer).
The survey employed similar questions, as were used in the initial study of the first academic seminar of the ACLM', to further examine the attitudes of this population as regards the extension of professional privilege to the doctor/patient relationship. The questionnaire (see Appendix) also aimed to define the attitudes of the participants concerning what should constitute the most appropriate response to patients who may not understand the concerns of doctors as regards 'fitness to drive' or for whom it is apparent that the patient will continue to drive irrespective of the advice not to do so.
The questionnaire also explored what should be the most suitable charge to be legally imposed upon a patient for whom it is apparent that he/she was responsible for a fatality as a consequence of driving in clear contravention of unequivocal evidence that the doctor had advised against the same.
RESULTS
Of the 23 respondents, 14 had both medical and legal qualifications; one was a barrister whose initial degree was as a pharmacist, seven respondents had only medical qualifications and one respondent was a Ph.D. scientist, with neither medical nor legal qualifications, but who was responsible for the tissue donor service at a major Sydney teaching hospital. All those who had dual qualifications in medicine and law had first graduated in medicine prior to studying law. Three of these respondents indicated that they practiced both in medicine and law and one who held a postgraduate medical qualification (including the Diploma of Obstetrics and Fellowship of the Royal Australian College of General Practitioners) also held an Honours Degree in Law and practised as a lawyer rather than as a doctor. The remainder of those who had dual qualifications still considered themselves principally as doctors. Of those with both degrees, eight also had post-graduate medical qualifications (which included the Colleges of Surgeons, Physicians, Pathologists, General Practitioners, and Faculty of Public Health Medicine, together with both masters and post-graduate diplomas in areas such as Public Health, Obstetrics and Anaesthetics). Concurrently, seven of this group also held more than basic legal qualifications, with honours' and masters' degrees.
Asked if there should be professional privilege between doctor and patient, 20123 agreed, two disagreed and one was undecided. When considering the extent of such privilege, 18/23 felt that it should not be absolute, 4/23 felt that it should be absolute and again the same respondent (a doctor with post-graduate training in general practice but no legal qualifications) was undecided. Among those who agreed that professional privilege should be absolute between doctor and patient was one of the respondents who worked both as a lawyer and doctor, one with dual qualification who practised mainly as a doctor, a doctor with only medical training and the scientist.
All respondents, except one with dual qualification, agreed that doctors should have the right to report patients who posed a risk.
When seeking to make such reporting a duty, the response was less categorical with 14/23 accepting that such a duty existed, 6123 disputed that such was a duty and three were undecided. All of the three who were undecided had dual qualifications in medicine and law. 416, who denied the existence of a duty to report patients who failed to comply with medical advice not to drive, also held dual qualification and this included two of the three respondents who practiced both as lawyers and doctors.
In response to an open-ended option for a commentary, there was repeated acknowledgement of the need for the patients to 'be able to freely communicate with their medical adviser without fear of any of this confidential information being divulged'. One respondent, who qualified the difference between a 'right' and a 'duty', as regards to reporting, indicated the need for specified limits set as a matter of public policy and clearly justifiable as being in the public interest with health and welfare of the community being the paramount consideration.
These sentiments were echoed by others, with the suggestion that the area of confidentiality and privilege needed to be included within the training provided to doctors in their undergraduate curriculum.
One respondent pointed out that the need for professional privilege in law was necessary for the better function of law but the same was not necessary in medicine. This respondent practised both as a lawyer and doctor. In contrast, another respondent, who also practised as both a lawyer and doctor, felt that privilege helped both disciplines to function better but that the needs were different.
It was acknowledged that there was a need to provide protection for doctors who did breach confidentiality. One respondent suggested that, with some psychologically disturbed patients, the doctor may place him/herself in risk of real physical danger by divulging confidential and potentially damaging information.
When questioned as to the appropriate response to take in the situation in which there was concern regarding the patient's understanding of the doctor's advice not to drive, approximately half the respondents (12/23) stated that, in the absence of consent to discuss the matter, they would simply report the situation to the driving authorities. Seven respondents indicated that they would discuss the matter with family members/friends without the patient's consent to do so. Four indicated that they would only discuss the matter with family/friends if there was patient consent and one respondent indicated that no further action should be taken.
While the questionnaire clearly asked respondents to prioritise their answers and to give a single response, two respondents could not choose between discussion with family/friends without consent or simply to report the patient to the driving authorities without the patient's consent. A solitary respondent was undecided as to what was the most appropriate action to take.
Respondents were again given the chance to provide additional commentary. One dual-qualified respondent identified the need to better educate both patients and doctors regarding the necessity to balance competing private and public rights. While the question allowed for only one response, a South Australian doctor (with dual qualifications) pointed out that reporting the patient to the driving authorities was mandatory in South Australia and stated that he would report the patient as a first priority and then might discuss this with family/friends without the patient's consent. One doctor, who was completing a law degree, indicated that, where there was concern as regards the patient's actions, it was usually not as a consequence of lack of understanding and hence reporting without consent was appropriate. A respondent, who practised both as a lawyer and doctor. wrote:
as the law stands at present, unfitness to drive is not a 'notifiable' condition, and to do so would expose the doctor to liability for breach of confidence. However, unfitness to drive, for medical reasons, ought to be made notifiable, with protection of the doctor for disclosure, in order to meet the doctor's higher duty to society as a whole.
This respondent indicated that he would take no further action in the face of concern that a patient did not understand advice against driving.
Another dual-qualified doctor suggested that problems may arise by discussing the patient with family/friends without consent but that no such issue emerged by notifying the driving authorities, in the absence of consent to discuss matters, and so indicated that selection. A number of respondents pointed out that public interest outweighed private rights of confidentiality. One doctor, without legal training, alluded to the fact that patients may well change medical attendants to achieve a positive outcome, irrespective of the action taken. Another doctor, without legal training, stated that in the past he had actually seized a patient's car keys and given them to the police.
A dual-qualified doctor stated that discussion of the matter of concern with family/friends did not constitute breach of confidentiality and would achieve the desired outcome in an estimated 50% of cases.
Respondents were also asked to define their approach to the situation where it was apparent that the patient would drive, contrary to medical advice, and 13/23 stated that they would document the fact and would then advise the patient that a report would be provided to the driving authority contrary to the patient's wishes. An additional 4/23 stated that they would advise the driving authority without the patient's knowledge while a further 4/23 would document the fact, advise the patient that a report would be furnished, but would not proceed with the report against the patient's will. Two respondents, both of whom practiced in both law and medicine, stated that they would document the fact and take no further action. The four respondents who indicated that they would threaten action, but would not proceed with it without consent, were dual qualified and included the other respondent who practised both as a lawyer and doctor. Of the four who would act without the patient's knowledge, three were dual qualified and one had medical training, including fellowship of the Royal Australian College of General Practitioners.
In response to the opportunity to provide extra commentary, one dual-qualified doctor indicated that he would document and advise without the patient's knowledge even though he acknowledged that to openly notify against the patient's will was a better option. He provided a commentary to say, you may 'get away' without the patient being aware who did it, when reporting a patient without the patient's knowledge. Most other respondents, who indicated that they would notify with the patient's knowledge, but against the patient's consent, felt that this was the most compatible response to both medical ethics and public interest.
The dual-qualified doctor from South Australia again referred to the legal requirements and hence indicated that there was no need to advise the patient that a report would be supplied as this was a mandatory procedure. Another dual-qualified doctor, who selected the option of notice without knowledge, indicated that 'notification against consent' was still a viable option but that the choice should be made on a case-by-case evaluation. The survey sought prioritisation and allowed for a single choice. One of the respondents, who practised both as a lawyer and doctor, emphasised the need for patient education regarding the reasons why driving was ill-advised. This was not the same respondent who earlier advocated more education but he concluded his remarks with the statement 'be persuasive, not dictatorial' and he selected the option that dictated documentation without further action.
Respondents were asked to nominate the appropriate charge to be imposed on a patient who killed someone as a consequence of driving, contrary to clear and documented medical advice not to do so. In the responses lo/23 (five with dual qualification, including two who practised both as lawyers and doctors) nominated various categories of murder (two: murder with intent to kill; two: murder with intent to cause grievous bodily harm; six: murder with reckless indifference to human life). Five of this sub-group (including four with dual qualifications of whom two had dual practices) gave alternative lesser charges, including manslaughter (even though the questionnaire sought a single response). 12/23 opted for categories of manslaughter (six: manslaughter with criminal negligence; three: manslaughter with unlawful or dangerous acts; three: manslaughter with subjective foresight as to the probability of grievous bodily harm). Three respondents chose the charge of culpable driving, of whom two, with dual qualification, identified the absence of mens rea (guilty mind) as the reason for the lesser charge and one, with dual practice, did so because of the fact that a charge for murder or manslaughter could possibly indict the doctor as an accessory before the fact. One respondent, who practised both as a lawyer and doctor, opted for the alternative charge of 'causing death by dangerous driving', pointing out that there were state-by-state differences in the criminal justice system. The South Australian, dual-qualified doctor, commented that the penological options and approaches were 'of much greater interest' than the actual charge imposed. Another doctor, without legal training, was non-committal, indicating that the charges must depend upon the situation and cited emergency as mitigating circumstances. Two respondents, the sole lawyer and a dual qualified doctor, could not decide on the appropriate charge.
DISCUSSION
The survey was conducted amongst those who attended the second academic seminar of the ACLM". The ACLM was first formed in 1995 with a charter to bring together doctors who were also trained in law and who had significant experience in designated areas of legal medicine. This group was deemed ideal for the purposes of exploring the concepts of appropriate responses to patients who failed to respect medical advice not to drive. It was further felt that the response to failure to comply with medical advice was a necessary extension of the earlier study2.
It is accepted that the sample size was small but that this was more than compensated for by the quality of the respondents, which included 14 doctors with formal qualifications in law, of whom three practised both as lawyers and doctors. Some might contend that those with dual qualifications were trained only to the basic levels of medicine and law but such an argument is quashed when it is revealed that 8/14 held post-graduate medical qualifications from a variety of specialist medical colleges thereby demonstrating the breadth of medical experience encompassed in this sample population. At the same time, 7/14 had more than basis legal qualifications, including master's and honour's degrees, thereby indicating the significant quality of legal interpretation that was provided by this population.
When comparing the training and approaches of doctors and lawyers it has been argued that each discipline provides the student with a different mode of examining any particular question .
I2 It follows that the combination of both qualifications should equip the person for a more competent and analytical assessment of medicolegal problems. It is with this backdrop of a rarefied, highly qualified sample of doctors, with training in legal medicine that the current survey was undertaken with the specific purpose of exploring questions of professional privilege, which lawyers take for granted but which is less entrenched within the practices of doctors.
The majority of respondents, 20/23 supported the need for professional privilege for the doctor/patient relationship but a similar number 18/23, indicated that such a privilege should not be absolute. All but one (22/23) felt that doctors should have a right to report patients whom they felt posed a risk to the public interest. There appeared less agreement when the 'right' became a 'duty' to report, and 14123 considered such reporting to be a duty, although it was still a majority response, while 6/23 denied there existed such a duty. These figures were similar to the earlier survey regarding professional privilege2 but the ratio of those who supported the notion of reporting as a duty was considerably reduced (0.74 as compared to 0.61).
The situation in which reporting is obligatory has been previously reviewed6*'T9* to and it is universally accepted that mandatory reporting of patients, to the driving authorities, carries with it a serious risk to undermine the doctor/patient relationship. It is argued that if the patient is fearful that the doctor may disclose sensitive information, then the patient may choose to be dishonest with the doctor, a situation which has the potential to compromise the delivery of optimal medical care. The opening quotation' highlighted the ethical need to respect the confidential nature of medical relationships. Lord Denning13 encapsulated these views when he stated:
The law of confidentiality depends on the broad principle of equity that he who has received information in confidence shall not take unfair advantage of it. He must not make use of it to the prejudice of him who gave it without seeking his consent.
These sentiments were reinforced from the Canadian jurisdiction, from which is quoted the following passaget4, Members of the medical profession have a duty of confidentiality with respect to their patients. They are under restraint not to volunteer information respecting the condition of their patient or any professional services performed by them without their patient's consent. In the absence of such consent, members of the medical profession breach their duty if they disclose such information unless required to do so by due process of law.
Chapman, at a recent forum of the Australian Medical Association (AMA) held in conjunction with the Australian Association of Practice Managers (AAPM)t5 stated:
The ethical duty to keep secret anything learned in the course of treating a patient is also a legal duty on the basis that the law irnplies a term into the contract whereby a professional [person] is to keep [his or her] clients' secrets and not to disclose them unto anyone without just cause.
Chapman went on to define the exceptions such as: with the patient's consent; by order of the court; (if a court orders a doctor to divulge information, as by subpoena, where failure to comply may be deemed contempt); disclosure to a colleague (as in the case of doctors discussing case details); or in the public interest.
Exploring public interest, as is relevant to later discussions concerning disclosure, leads one to the Californian case of Tarasoff v. The Regents of the University of California 16. In this case, Mr Poddar killed Tatiana Tarasoff and Tarasoff's parents successfully claimed that Poddar's therapist was liable for failure to directly report a known risk to the potential victim, even though the therapist had alerted the police. In W v. Edge11 " W was a patient held in a secure hospi-, tal, having shot and killed five people and wounded another two. After 10 years he sought less restrictive custody, or release, and Dr Edge11 was employed to prepare a report on W's mental health. The report was unfavourable and W sought to suppress it by withdrawing his application for review. Recognising what was happening, Dr Edge11 released his report to the hospital's medical director, who subsequently sent a copy 'with Dr Edgell's consent' to the secretary of state. W sued Dr Edge11 for breach of confidentiality but the Court of Appeal considered the exceptional circumstances justified the limited disclosure as had occurred. The question emerged as to what would be justifiable had disclosure been more broadly based and comes to the heart of the question of confidentiality and the management of such patients.
The latitude of what constitutes 'exceptional circumstances' is not well-defined and hence the purpose of the additional questions, to seek guidance from this select panel of doctors with legal training. Respondents were asked to nominate the appropriate response to a patient who may have uncontrolled epilepsy, but who may, or does, ignore the doctor's advice against driving. Where there was concern that a patient did not fully comprehend the gravity of the situation or the implications of the advice precluding driving, 7/23 would discuss the matter with family/friends in contravention to patient's consent, and established ethical principles'. One doctor, without legal training, highlighted the effectiveness of this approach and claimed that it would provide a 50% success rate. However, one cannot ignore that such action does breach the patient's right to confidentiality and could result in an action, consequent to a breach of an implied term of contract between the patient and doctor, as defined in the earlier quotation from Lord Denning'3. The patient may, if so inclined, seek a number of remedies if confidentiality is breached", be it by contract law or the tort of medical negligence with failure of 'duty of care', which does include the provision of privacy.
Professional privilege was the subject of a debate at the 21st International Epilepsy Congress (IEC)'g~20. The debate focused upon the differences between the French legal system, in which medical-in-confidence is codified into the penal system*' and the US jurisdiction in which a 'right' to report remains valid and a 'duty' to report may be implied from the Tarasoff case. The consensus of the current survey favoured a less rigid implementation of the right to override confidentiality.
It may still prove difficult to justify discussion with the patient's family/friends against that patient's consent, when seeking a defence against a claim for breach of confidentiality, even with the advice provided by the respondent who indicated a 50% successful outcome.
The risk of action, for breach of confidentiality, is less of a worry when it involves reporting to the driving authorities**, thereby supporting the actions of 17/23 respondents. However, only 13/17 would fulfil the ethical requirement to advise the patient of the intended notification'. Only 6/23 indicated that they would abide by the wishes of the patient, if there appeared concern as to understanding of the reasons for doctors to advise against driving and of the six, all were dually qualified and three practised both as lawyers and doctors. It could be argued that the legal training may impose greater pressure upon the therapist to honour the expectations of the patient (client), or alternatively that doctors (without legal training) were more likely to take unilateral decisive action once they had reached a decision as to the appropriateness of such an activity. This latter view is in concert with opinion regarding the different approaches adopted by lawyers and doctors'*. As stated by the South Australian respondent with dual qualification, who functioned in the state with mandated reporting, there can be no ethical dilemma associated with reporting, irrespective of advice to or from the patient.
Once it is clear that the patient will ignore advice to refrain from driving, the situation becomes more critical. There is now an unequivocal foreseeable risk and it might be argued that the doctor has a dual 'duty of care', both to the patient and society. It may be argued that the doctor has no greater duty to society than does anyone else, such as a spouse, parent or knowing acquaintance although the counter proposition is that the doctor is in a better position to understand the foreseeable risk.
Lord Atkins23 in Donoghue v. Stevenson stated, You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour.
If it is known that the person poses a risk to society, then the doctor is arguably 'duty-bound' to act if the use of the word 'you' is directed towards the physician who is more than a mere observer. Lord Wilberforce, 50 years after the statement by Lord Atkins, wrote24, the question has to be approached in two stages. First one has to ask . . . [is there] a sufficient relationship of proximity or neighbourhood such that, in the reasonable contemplation of the former, carelessness on his part may be likely to cause damage to the latter . . . Secondly, if the first question is answered affirmatively, it is necessary to consider whether there are any considerations which ought to negate, or to reduce or limit the scope of the duty or the class of person to whom it is owed.
The tempered response from the dual-qualified doctors would suggest that they perceived that the question of 'confdentiulify' may well 'negate' the duty to report. It is clear, as is the case in most questions of legal opinion, that there are no absolute answers. This was encapsulated by Lord Oliveg5 who stated:
In the end, it . . . depends more upon the Court's perception of what is the reasonable area for the imposition of liability than upon any logical process of analytical deduction.
Flemingz6 summed up the legal argument by stating
In the decision whether to recognise a duty in a given situation, many factors interplay: the hand of history, our ideas of morals and justice, the convenience of administering the rule and our social ideas as to where the loss should fall.
the Court. It would seem appropriate to advise patients that the option for a charge of murder, in these circumstances, is a viable outcome if this is possible within the society in which the patient lives.
The sample that was surveyed in this study, including a significant number of dual-qualified doctors and lawyers, determined that the right to report should be upheld, that most felt it was their duty to report and that they would do so, with, or without, consent from the patient, if they perceived a real threat to the community. The repeated comment of the need for education should not be overlooked. It is significant that the ACLM has been formed in Australia, which may find a role in such education. Similarly, one should not ignore the truism 'be persuasive, not dictatorial' as this is the hallmark of the effective doctor/patient relationship, in which the patient should make the decisions, but be guided to make the right decisions, namely not to drive while there exists a real risk to injure self or others. Proper handling of this type of situation should avoid conflict and the potential for litigation.
Perhaps the most alarming comment was the one provided by the respondent who suggested that if the patient was found guilty of murder, then the doctor, who failed to report that the patient posed a risk, may be found guilty of being an accessory before the fact. While it is freely acknowledged that this situation is purely hypothetical, it should still provide doctors with a cogent argument to notify authorities regarding patients who do pose a risk, both to themselves and others within the community. Despite the fact that such a charge for the doctor is highly unlikely, one would have to conclude that this application is improbable rather than impossible. It is clear that society is placing increasingly greater expectations upon the medical profession and with time, the improbable may become less so.
The final issue which necessitates discussion is the question of what charge should be imposed upon a patient who causes a fatality by ignoring the doctor's advice not to drive. It is apparent that the majority of respondents attached serious consequences to this circumstance with 17123 considering that the appropriate charge should be one of either murder or manslaughter with the sub-categories thereof. The question of mens rea was raised by those who chose to apply lesser charges because they questioned the presence of a 'guilty mind'. This was countered by the content of the question which clearly stipulated that the patient was conscious of the fact that their action was in contravention of advice given and thus the act was clearly wilful. Of the eight respondents who chose murder, five chose the category of 'reckless indifference' which would seem appropriate and may provide physicians with a real deterrent when discussing the matter with their patients. It is sobering for patients to realise that a sample, such as this, with highly qualified doctors, many of whom also held legal qualification, and some of whom practised both as lawyers and doctors, would seek severe penalty from patients who caused a fatality when ignoring the doctor's advice not to drive. Assuming that such a select and well-educated sample represents the views of the community in which they practice, then it would seem appropriate that information to this effect should provide the attending doctor with a most persuasive argument to encourage patients to avoid driving. As with earlier issues, the final outcome will rest with II.
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APPENDIX: QUESTIONNAIRE
At the 21st International Epilepsy Conference in Sydney, on 4 September 1995, there was a main topic which examined 'Epilepsy and rhe Law'. One of the themes that was singled out for extra consideration was the issue of professional privilege as might exist between doctor and patient, similar to the privileged relationship that exists between lawyer and client. As part of that discussion members of the audience were asked to respond to a number of questions which will also be asked of those attending this scientific meeting of the Australian College of Legal Medicine. The response will then be compared with those that were provided for the earlier Sydney meeting.
Preliminary questions
If a doctor has concerns about a patient's fitness to drive, and the patient does not seem to understand the concerns, should the doctor: (a) Take no further action. [ 1 (b) Discuss the matter with family members/friends and only do so with the patient's consent.
[ 1 (c) Discuss the matter with family members/friends without the patient's consent. [ 1 (d) In the absence of consent to discuss the matter, simply report the patient to the driving authorities.
1
Please comment on why you chose the selection above.
Please select only ONE of the choices below and place a tick in the appropriate box.
Question 3
If it is apparent that a patient is going to drive contrary to medical advice, should the doctor:
(a) Ignore the fact.
(b) Document the fact and take no further action.
(c) Document the fact and advise the patient that he/she will report the patient to the driving authorities, but not do so against the patient's will.
(d) Document the fact and advise the patient that he/she will report the patient to the driving authorities, and do so against the patient's will.
(e) Document the fact and report the patient to the driving authorities, without the patient's knowledge.
[ 1
Question 4
If a patient drives a car, contrary to clear and documented medical advice against so doing, and as a result kills someone-should the patient be charged with:
(a) Murder;
-with intent to kill.
-with intent to cause grievous bodily harm.
-with reckless indifference to human life.
-with constructive murder.
(b) Manslaughter;
-with criminal negligence.
-with unlawful or dangerous acts.
-with subjective foresight as to the possibility of death.
-with subjective foresight as to the probability of grievous bodily harm. 
